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ABSTRACT. Institutions play an important role in shaping individual incentives in complex social-ecological systems, by encouraging
or discouraging resource overuse. In the Gulf of California, Mexico, there is widespread evidence of declines in small-scale fishery
stocks, largely attributed to policy failures. We investigated formal and informal rules-in-use regulating access and resource use by
small-scale fishers in the two most important fishing communities of the Midriff  Islands region in the Gulf of California, which share
several target species and fishing grounds. The Midriff  Islands region is a highly productive area where sustainable use of fisheries
resources has been elusive. Our study aimed to inform policy by providing information on how management and conservation policies
perform in this unique environment. In addition, we contrast attributes of the enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons
in an effort to better understand why these communities, albeit showing several contrasting attributes of the above conditions, have
not developed sustainable fishing practices. We take a novel, comprehensive institutional approach that includes formal and informal
institutions, incorporating links between land (i.e., communal land rights) and sea institutions (i.e., fisheries and conservation policies)
and their effects on stewardship of fishery resources, a theme that is practically unaddressed in the literature. Insufficient government
support in provision of secure rights, enforcement and sanctioning, and recognition and incorporation of local arrangements and
capacities for management arose as important needs to address in both cases. We highlight the critical role of higher levels of governance,
that when disconnected from local practices, realities, and needs, can be a major impediment to achieving sustainability in small-scale
fisheries, even in cases where several facilitating conditions are met.
RESUMEN. Resumen: Las instituciones desempeñan un papel importante en la determinación de los incentivos individuales en sistemas
socio-ecológicos complejos, alentando o desalentando la sobreexplotación. En el Golfo de California, México, existe amplia evidencia
de una marcada disminución en la abundancia de recursos pesqueros de pequeña escala o artesanales, atribuida a fracasos en las
políticas de manejo. Este trabajo investiga las reglas formales e informales en uso para regular acceso y uso de recursos por parte de
pescadores artesanales en las dos comunidades pesqueras más importantes de la Región de las Grandes Islas, Golfo de California. A
pesar de su elevada productividad biológica, el uso sustentable de los recursos marinos en esta región ha sido difícil de alcanzar. Este
trabajo proporcionamo información para optimizar el desempeño de los instrumentos de manejo y conservación de recursos marinos
presentes en este ambiente único. Además, contrastamos los atributos de las condiciones que facilitan la sustentabilidad en el uso de
recursos de uso común, para comprender mejor por qué estas comunidades no han logrado incorporar de manera duradera prácticas
de pesca sustentables, a pesar de presentar, en el caso particular de una de ellas, varias condiciones propicias. Adoptamos un enfoque
institucional novedoso e integral que incluye instituciones formales e informales, e incorpora los vínculos entre reglas relativas a la
tenencia de la tierra (ej. derechos de uso comunales) y del ámbito marino (de pesca y conservación), y sus efectos sobre el cuidado de
los recursos marinos, un tópico prácticamente sin abordar en la literatura. Surgen como limitantes importantes en ambos casos, un
apoyo gubernamental insuficiente tanto en la provisión de derechos de pesca seguros como en la fiscalización y la aplicación de sanciones,
y la falta de reconocimiento e incorporación de arreglos institucionales y capacidades de manejo locales en instancias formales de
decisión. Resaltamos el papel fundamental que cumplen los niveles de gobernanza más elevados, los que al estar desvinculados de las
prácticas, realidades y necesidades locales, pueden obstaculizar de manera significativa el alcance de la sustentabilidad en pesquerías
artesanales, incluso cuando varias condiciones favorables están presentes.
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INTRODUCTION
Current common pool resource[1] theory suggests that given a set
of ecological, physical, social, and institutional constraints,
people consider the costs and benefits of various behaviors and
act according to perceived incentives (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al.
2002). Institutions are the rules that people develop to specify
“dos and don’ts” related to a particular situation, such as who has
access to a resource, what can be harvested, and who participates
in key decisions (Ostrom et al. 2002). Rules play an important role
in shaping individual incentives in complex social-ecological
systems, thus encouraging or discouraging resource overuse
(Ostrom 2007). They may comprise a combination of formal,
written rules, that are often established by governments, and
locally crafted rules—usually unwritten—that are developed by
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Fig. 1. Map of the study area. The MPAs in the area are: Bahía de los Ángeles, Canales de Ballenas
y de Salsipuedes Biosphere Reserve; Archipiélago de San Lorenzo National Park; and Isla San
Pedro Mártir Biosphere Reserve.
resource users. Rules that are actually used in field settings are
called rules-in-use; they may differ substantially from formal laws
and are not easily observable. This can lead to erroneous
assumptions if  managers believe that rules-in-use and formal rules
are the same, or that formal rules are the only institutions in place
(Ostrom 1992, Ensminger 1996). Studying how rules-in-use,
especially those related to access and resource use, affect
harvesting behavior is critical for the sustainability of fisheries
and other common pool resources.  
The Gulf of California, Mexico (Fig. 1) is characterized by
exceptionally high levels of primary productivity and biodiversity
and outstanding economic and social significance (Carvajal et al.
2004). Fishing, both large scale and small scale, is a predominant
economic activity throughout the region. It generates over 50,000
jobs involving approximately 26,000 vessels, of which
approximately 25,000 are small-scale boats (Cisneros-Mata
2010). Widespread evidence of declining marine resources in the
Gulf of California is largely attributed to policy failures (Alcalá
2003, Greenberg 2006). Recently, however, significant legislative
changes, including a new fisheries law, have attempted to address
these declines (Diario Oficial de la Federación 2007a).  
The goal of our study was to investigate formal and informal
rules-in-use that regulate access and resource use by small-scale
fishers, and the effects of the rules on fisheries sustainability. The
study occurred in Bahía de Los Ángeles on the Baja California
peninsula, State of Baja California, and in Bahía de Kino in
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continental Mexico, State of Sonora, both located in the Midriff
Islands region (Fig. 1). The Midriff  Islands region is an
archipelago of 45 islands and islets with a high degree of
biological diversity and endemism; it is a highly productive region
where sustainable use of fisheries resources has been elusive. Our
study aimed to inform policy by providing information on how
management and conservation policies perform in this unique
environment, in the two most important fishing communities of
the area, which share several target species and fishing grounds.
In addition, we contrasted attributes of the enabling conditions
for sustainability on the commons (Agrawal 2001) in an effort to
better understand why these communities, albeit showing several
contrasting attributes of the above conditions, have not developed
sustainable fishing practices.  
Our study took a novel, comprehensive approach that includes
formal and informal institutions, incorporating links between
land (i.e., communal land rights) and sea institutions (i.e., fisheries
and conservation policies) and their effects on stewardship of
fishery resources, a theme that is practically unaddressed in the
literature. Addressing this link is important because land and sea
institutions may interact to create unanticipated rules-in-use,
which may either help or hinder sustainable use of fishery
resources.  
Studies on the commons need to deal with multiple levels of
governance and external drivers of change (e.g., impact of
government policies and markets) (Agrawal 2001, Berkes 2006).
This research is an effort to address this demand by focusing on
multiple levels of governance (e.g., land vs. sea institutions;
external vs. local governance) and local effects of government
policies as external drivers of change.
METHODS
We used the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
(IAD) (Ostrom 1990) together with Ostrom’s classification of
rules (Ostrom 1999) to identify potentially relevant variables to
explore (institutional, biophysical, and social) and to design data-
collection instruments.  
We obtained information on formal and informal arrangements
that regulate access and resource use by examining legal
documents, using semistructured and structured interviews, and
by participant observation (Hay 2005, Bernard 2006). Legal
documents included fisheries and environmental legislation,
documents of formalized groups of fishers (e.g., cooperatives),
and official information (e.g., fishing permits issued, statistics).
We conducted semistructured interviews with key informants of
formalized groups of fishers (typically fishing cooperatives in
Bahía de Kino, and Sociedades de Producción Rural[2] in Bahía
de Los Ángeles) in order to gather information about internal
organization and past and present occurrence of informal fishery
arrangements. We also conducted semistructured interviews with
key informants from federal agencies about local implementation
of management/conservation tools and regulations, enforcement,
and access issues. Finally, we conducted structured interviews
with captains of small-scale boats. Captains are generally the most
experienced and knowledgeable fishers on the boat and tend to
make the decisions about fishing (Moreno et al. 2005a).  
Structured interviews included: demographic information about
respondents (age, sex, place of birth); employment (history of
fishing, method of fishing, species targeted, sources of income);
organization (membership in formal groups, reasons for joining
the group); access to fishing and commercialization of resources
(ownership of fishing permits and equipment, autonomy to
finance fishing trips, buyers of catch); and perceptions of
performance of existing policy tools and regulations. We assessed
perceptions through open-ended questions and a set of statements
with a five-point Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, neutral,
disagree, strongly disagree). Due to the high number of fishing
groups in Bahía de Kino, we added a section to the structured
interview for gathering additional information about fishery-
related informal arrangements. For Bahía de Los Ángeles, due to
the community’s communal land tenure history, we conducted
additional semistructured interviews with key informants to
explore perceptions of the link between the presence of communal
land tenure and the sense of use-rights over fishing grounds. 
We conducted research in Bahía de Kino from April to August
2007, focusing on the small-scale fisheries sector of commercial
divers (Table 1). In Bahía de Los Ángeles, field work took place
from mid November to mid December 2008 (Table 1). The small
size of Bahía de Los Ángeles allowed us to extend the study to
include gillnets and trap fishing, as well as diving.  
We collected information about fishing zones through a rapid
appraisal (Beebe 1995) conducted in 2005–2006 in 17 fishing
communities of the Gulf of California (see Moreno-Báez et al.
2010 for methodology details). We obtained additional social and
biophysical information through literature review.
SOCIO-BIOPHYSICAL ATTRIBUTES OF FISHERIES IN
BAHÍA DE LOS ÁNGELES AND BAHÍA DE KINO
Small and isolated vs. big and connected
Bahía de Los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino are both rural fishing
coastal communities in the Gulf of California (Fig. 1). Bahía de
Los Ángeles is a small, isolated community of approximately 500
inhabitants, located over 500 km from any major cities. In
contrast, Bahía de Kino is a much larger community of
approximately 5000 inhabitants, situated only 100 km from the
state capital (Hermosillo). In both cases, the closest major cities
are primary destinations of local marine resources prior to
redistribution to other regional, national, and international
markets (primarily the US and Asia).  
Bahía de Los Ángeles is a remote location with low influxes of
new settlers, where most of the population comprises relatives of
the families that were first permanently established in the area
(Danemann and Ezcurra 2007). In contrast, Bahía de Kino has
received several immigration pulses of people displaced from
other coastal communities or from different parts of Mexico,
resulting in a more dynamic and heterogeneous population
(Doode 2001; Moreno et al. 2005a).  
Historically (1930s–present) both communities have been highly
dependent on marine resources for their livelihoods (Moreno et
al. 2005a, Danemann and Ezcurra 2007). In Bahía de Kino,
fishing represented approximately 46% of the local GDP in 2000
(Moreno et al. 2005a) (data not available for Bahía de Los
Ángeles). Our structured interviews indicate that 71% of
respondents relied solely on fishing for their income, compared
to 60% in Bahía de Los Ángeles.  
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Table 1. Type and number of interviews conducted in each community.
 Type of interview Bahía de Kino Bahía de Los Ángeles
Semistructured
Subjects: key members of formalized
groups of fishers.
Topic: internal organization and past
and present occurrence of informal
fishery arrangements.
n=5
(leaders of cooperatives)
n=5
(leaders of Sociedades de Producción
Rural)
Semistructured
Subjects: key informants from federal
agencies with fisheries and conservation
mandates.
Topic: implementation of management/
conservation tools and regulations,
enforcement, and access issues.
n=2
(a fisheries authority and a leader of the
permit holders’ sector)
n=3
(a fisheries authority and two
environment agencies officials)
Semistructured
Subjects: key informants from the
community.
Topic: link between communal land
tenure and emergence of strong sense of
use-rights over adjacent fishing grounds.
— n=7
Structured
Subjects: boat captains (experienced
fishers).
Topic: varied (demographics,
employment, formal organization, access
to fishing, and commercialization of
harvests, etc.).
n=45
– Respondents from six major groups of
divers.
– Respondents from 40 out of
approximately 80 active diving boats (50%
of active boats).
n=30
– Respondents from nearly all groups of
fishers in town.
– Respondents from 30 out of
approximately 37 active boats (about 80%
of active boats).
In Bahía de Los Ángeles small-scale fisheries are substantially
smaller than in Bahía de Kino, with approximately 70 fishers and
37 boats (Avendaño-Ceceña et al. 2009), and three main fishing
methods (main target species in parentheses): gillnets (flounder,
Paralichthys californicus; sharks Mustelus spp., Galeorhinus spp.);
traps (octopus, Octopus spp; reef fishes, mainly Paralabrax spp.);
and hookah diving (octopus; sea cucumber, Istiotichopus fuscus;
clams, several species) (Valdez and Torreblanca 2008). Bahía de
Kino, in contrast, has approximately 800 fishers and 200 boats
actively involved in small-scale fisheries (Comunidad y
Biodiversidad, unpublished data). Approximately 80 boats were
active in commercial diving in 2007, targeting primarily pen shells
(mainly Atrina spp.), octopus, and reef fishes (groupers and
snappers) (see Cinti et al. 2010a for more detail). Sea cucumber
is an important and highly priced fishery for Bahía de Kino divers,
though clandestine; the agency governing permits has granted no
authorizations for the species in Bahía de Kino. In Bahía de Los
Ángeles, in contrast, some users have been granted authorizations
for sea cucumber since 2005.
Overfished resources despite high productivity
In spite of the outstanding biological productivity of the Midriff
Islands region (Álvarez-Borrego 2007), many Bahía de Los
Ángeles and Bahía de Kino target species have experienced similar
boom and bust cycles, starting with totoaba (Totoaba macdonaldi)
in the 1910s and 1920s; shark species in the 1930s; and sea turtles
in the 1950s (e.g., Chelonia spp.). Researchers recently detected
declines in target species production in both communities.  
In Bahía de Los Ángeles, Valdez and Torreblanca (2008)
suggested a deterioration of local fisheries, with alarming declines
(e.g., sea cucumber, sharks, sand bass). Assessments of sea
cucumber stocks in Baja California State in 2010 indicate that the
fishery is near collapse (Calderón-Aguilera and Herrero-Perezrul
2011). In spite of this, Bahía de Los Ángeles fishers have a fairly
small range (Danemann and Ezcurra 2007), suggesting that they
still find it profitable to operate nearby the community (Fig. 2).
Interestingly, although it is difficult to access Bahía de Los
Ángeles by land, Bahía de Los Ángeles fishing grounds are
relatively easy to get to by sea (the minimum linear distance
between the Sonoran coast and Bahía de Los Ángeles is 87 km)
(Valdez and Torreblanca 2008). Bahía de Los Ángeles fishing
grounds are frequently visited by small-scale fishers from Sonora
(Bahía de Kino, Guaymas, Puerto Libertad) and the Pacific side
of the peninsula (e.g., Guerrero Negro) (Fig. 1) (Danemann and
Ezcurra 2007), placing even more pressure on the region’s
resources.  
In Bahía de Kino, most target species are overfished (Moreno et
al. 2005a, Cinti et al. 2010a). Three decades ago local fishers
worked primarily in the waters surrounding Bahía de Kino
(Fernández 2003). High immigration and increasing demand for
marine resources have resulted in decreasing resource abundance
(Moreno et al. 2005b). Currently, local fishers, particularly divers,
are regionally known for being highly migratory, using areas as
far away as Puerto Peñasco to the north (Cudney-Bueno and
Basurto 2009), states south of Sonora (Cinti et al. 2010a), and
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Fig. 2. Fishing zones by community and gear. Source: rapid appraisal conducted in 2005–2006,
Project PANGAS (Moreno-Báez 2010).
Ángel de la Guarda Island and the gulf  coast of the Baja
California Peninsula to the west (Fig. 2) (Moreno et al. 2005b).
Bahía de Los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino thus have overlapping
fishing zones, particularly among divers and gillnet fishers (Fig.
2), who encroach Bahía de Los Ángeles’ locally perceived
“territory” but not vice versa.
INSTITUTIONAL ATTRIBUTES OF FISHERIES IN
BAHÍA DE LOS ÁNGELES AND BAHÍA DE KINO
Government agencies and tools for fisheries management
Regulation of commercial uses of marine species in Mexico is
shared between a set of federal agencies within the fisheries side
of government and another set of agencies under the
environmental side (Fig. 3). The main tools to regulate access and
resource use of marine species include: (a) fishing licenses and
concessions; (b) single or multispecies management plans and
fishery ordinance plans (programas de ordenamiento pesquero);
(c) predios (“Predios Federales Sujetos a Manejo para la
Conservación y Aprovechamiento Sustentable de Vida
Silvestre”, Federal Polygons for the Conservation and
Sustainable Use of Wildlife), which are granted for species listed
under special protection (listed in the NOM 059-SEMARNAT
(Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales) (Diario
Oficial de la Federación 1994)); and (d) marine protected areas
(MPAs) (Fig. 3). Herein we describe fishing licenses, predios, and
MPAs because they are the most commonly found management
tools in the study area.  
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Fig. 3. Federal agencies involved in fisheries regulation in Mexico.
Fishing licenses may be granted to juridical persons (e.g., fishing
co-ops, companies) or individuals for a period of 2 to 5 years and
are renewable and nontransferable. In order to become a license
holder, proof of ownership of fishing equipment (boat and gear)
is required; active participation as crew member is not a requisite.
The license specifies the species or group of species to be harvested
within a broadly specified region. Access to the species and region
is generally not exclusive (several license holders may have access
to the same species and region), but there are exceptions. In the
state of Baja California, for example, licenses for benthic
organisms are issued without spatial overlap to avoid conflict
(SAGARPA, personal communication). A license holder is allowed
to hold several licenses and several boats per license. A boat that
belongs to a license holder can be registered on more than one
license (i.e., the same boat may fish several species). Each license
specifies the number of boats and technical specifications of the
fishing equipment (boat, motor, gear) authorized to harvest the
species. Only license holders can legally land and declare the catch
at regional fisheries offices and provide legal invoices (facturas)
for the product. Facturas certify legal ownership of the harvest
and are necessary to sell and transport the catch to regional or
international markets.  
Predios may be granted to juridical persons or individuals for a
period of one year. They are renewable upon compliance with
regulations and are transferable (Diario Oficial de la Federación
2000). Exclusivity over the permitted species and area does not
extend to other species, which can be harvested by others.
Grantees must comply with a regional management plan that
includes a harvest season and a quota. The latter is based on
annual assessments conducted by a research institute, university,
NGO, or private consultant, which may or may not involve
participation of fishers. Results are reported to a Technical
Committee, which advises SEMARNAT (Fig. 3) on quotas and
license renewals. A committee is created for each authorized
resource or group of resources and for a state or a region within
a state. Committees may comprise government agencies (federal,
state, or municipal), academic institutions, NGOs, fishers’
organizations, industry, and/or other private stakeholders.  
The most common type of MPA in the study area is the Biosphere
Reserve. It is a multiple-use MPA for which zones with different
degrees of protection are delimited; typically there are one or
more core zones with higher levels of protection where
conservation, education, and research activities are often
permitted, and a buffer zone where extractive activities may be
allowed. In Mexico, protected area legislation allows for
community participation and grants preferential access to
community members who live adjacent to the Biosphere Reserve.
For example, commercial activities within the buffer zone of
Biosphere Reserves can be performed only by the communities
who inhabited the area when the MPA is decreed or with their
participation (Art. 48, Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la
Protección al Ambiente (LGEEPA)). In addition, once an
approved management plan is in place, administration of a
protected area can be delegated by SEMARNAT to state,
municipal, or federal governments; ejidos[3]; agrarian
communities[3]; indigenous communities[3]; social groups; and
organizations, companies, and other interested juridical and
natural persons through formal agreements, provided that they
abide by the current laws and management plan (Art. 67,
LGEEPA).  
In addition to the above, other regulatory instruments for resource
use exist in the study area (norms by species, the National
Fisheries Chart [see Cinti et al 2010a]); they are not described here
because they minimally affect the main target species of Bahía de
Los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino.
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Formal rules and rules-in-use in Bahía de Los Ángeles and Bahía
de Kino
In Bahía de Los Ángeles a number of tools coexist. Fishing
licenses, the most widespread, are issued for fish and invertebrate
species (under Comisión Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca
(CONAPESCA), Fig. 3). Predios exist for sea cucumber (under
DGVS). Finally, the Bahía de los Ángeles, Canales de Ballenas y
de Salsipuedes Biosphere Reserve extends over the full range of
local fishers’ fishing grounds (under Comision Nacional de Áreas
Naturales Protegidas (CONANP)). In Bahía de Kino, licenses are
almost the only tool granted to access marine resources. In
addition, the Isla San Pedro Mártir Biosphere Reserve covers only
a small portion of local fishers’ fishing grounds. Our work in
Bahía de Kino did not focus on this MPA.
Authorities’ presence and enforcement ability
The presence of fisheries and environmental authorities differs
between the two communities, but the enforcement outcomes are
similar—virtually none. In Bahía de Los Ángeles the presence of
authorities in charge of regulation and enforcement is not
permanent, except for CONANP, which is in charge of MPA
administration. This absence makes it difficult for local fishers to
submit applications to request or renew licenses and predios or
to submit catch declarations. It also hinders agencies’ ability to
provide support to fishers. Interview results suggest that
environmental inspectors visited the community only once or
twice in 2008. Information about the arrival of fisheries or
environmental inspectors often filters into the community in
advance of the visit, giving fishers time to adjust activities and
make enforcement ineffective. CONANP can inform enforcement
agencies when fishery-related infractions are detected but it has
no actual enforcement authority. Although Bahía de Kino has a
regional fisheries office with at least one environmental inspector,
one or two fisheries inspectors as permanent staff, and permanent
CONANP staff  in the community, their enforcement capability
is limited given the large size of the area and the broad range of
activities to oversee (Cinti et al. 2010b).  
“Increased support from fisheries authorities” (especially for local
presence and enforcement) was among the top four answers of
respondents in both communities when members were asked what
changes were needed to improve the condition of local fishery
resources (Table 2). More than half  of respondents in both
communities disagreed with the idea that fisheries authorities have
had an important role in preventing the depletion of fishery
resources. In addition, more than 80% of respondents in both
communities agreed that implementation and enforcement of
regulations by local authorities were needed to improve fisheries.
Tools for fisheries management
Fishing licenses 
Table 3 shows the licenses granted in 2008–2009 for all fishing
sectors in Bahía de Los Ángeles, and in 2007–2008 for four
primary target species of commercial diving in Bahía de Kino
(the only available in official statistics). In Bahía de Los Ángeles,
octopus and bony and cartilaginous fishes had the highest number
of authorized boats, coincident with the salience of these
resources for local fishers, while in Bahía de Kino octopus and
pen shells were the target species for the bulk of authorized boats.  
Access to fishery resources in both communities was concentrated
in a few license holders (Table 3) (mostly nonfishers). Of these,
only some actively used their permits (in bold in Table 3). In Bahía
de Los Ángeles, the majority of license holders resided in major
cities (e.g., Ensenada, Tijuana) and did not fish locally. They are
generally perceived as illegitimate “outsiders”. They use their
licenses to shelter catch bought and/or extracted in other regions
and declare it as if  caught in Bahía de Los Ángeles, or sell invoices
to legitimize the commercialization of products caught without
a license (Danemann and Ezcurra 2007). Of the 20 Bahía de Los
Ángeles license holders in 2008–2009, only six (four individuals
and two Sociedades de Producción Rural, in bold in Table 3) live
in Bahía de Los Ángeles and actively received and commercialized
nearly the entire harvest of local fishers. They are generally seen
as legitimate members of the community by local fishers. 
In Bahía de Kino, most license holders operated and resided in
the community, but in addition to harvesting local resources, they
often commercialized products harvested in other communities’
jurisdictions, such as Bahía de Los Ángeles. This was due to the
high mobility of local divers, who travel long distances to find
profitable harvests, as well as the high mobility of local license
holders, who buy products from fishers from other communities.
Most Bahía de Kino license holders were absentee operators and
were generally perceived as a separate, powerful group that often
acts against fishers’ interests.  
Compared to Bahía de Kino, Bahía de Los Ángeles had a higher
percentage of fishers who sell their catch using their own licenses:
37% of Bahía de Los Ángeles respondents compared to none in
Bahía de Kino. Bahía de Los Ángeles fishers were also more in
control of the capture and commercialization of their harvest
than Bahía de Kino fishers: 60% of Bahía de Los Ángeles
respondents owned their fishing equipment compared to 24% in
Bahía de Kino; 20% of Bahía de Los Ángeles respondents relied
on others (license holders or buyers without license) to cover the
cost of fishing trips, compared to 91% in Bahía de Kino (fishers
are generally forced to sell the catch to the trip funder).  
In both communities, granting fishing permits to local fishers
instead of absentee license holders and easing the requirements
for locals to access licenses were primary concerns of fishers
(Question 1, Table 2).  
The number of boats authorized to each license holder in both
communities is rarely respected (irrespective of the species in
question) and license holders generally launder illegal catches
from local, unpermitted fishers. This practice is common
throughout the Gulf of California (Bourillón 2002, Moreno et
al. 2005a).  
Predios 
Beginning in 2005, in Baja California, predios were granted for
extraction of sea cucumber and almeja pismo (Tivela stultorum)
(Avendaño-Ceceña 2007). By 2008–2009, approximately 15
predios had authorized sea cucumber extraction in the state
(source: SEMARNAT). Fig. 4 shows the coastal extension of
predios (complete polygon coordinates were unavailable) granted
inside the Bahía de los Ángeles, Canales de Ballenas y de
Salsipuedes Biosphere Reserve and the corresponding quotas per
predio holder (PH), totaling 600 tonnes of sea cucumber
authorized for extraction inside the Biosphere Reserve during
2008-2009. Only four predio holders actively received sea
cucumber from Bahía de Los Ángeles fishers during the study
period (indicated in bold in legend of Fig. 4). One corresponded
to a Sociedad de Producción Rural of fishers who harvest sea
cucumber and are perceived by local fishers as legitimate; the rest
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Table 2. Fishers’ perceptions and attitudes about fisheries regulation in Bahía de Los Ángeles' and Bahía de Kino's small-scale fisheries,
assessed through structured interviews. † 
Bahía de Los Ángeles Bahía de Kino
1. What is missing in terms
of fishery regulation? ‡
— Grant fishing licenses to local fishers (57%).
— Increase support from authorities (in
enforcement and local presence) (43%).
— Simplify/expedite paperwork for locals to
access licenses (20%).
— Regulate resource use (temporal closures, mesh
size, quotas) (23%).
— Grant fishing licenses to local fishers (22%).
— Increase support from authorities (in
implementation and enforcement of current
regulations) (22%).
— Control entrance of outsider boats into local
fishing grounds (27%).
— More respect of regulations (22%).
2. Fishers’ perception of
usefulness of fishing licenses
to limit access §
— Fishing licenses were a useful tool to limit
access to local fishing grounds: 50% agreed, 47%
disagreed, 3% neutral.
— 40% agreed with the statement, 56%
disagreed, 4% neutral.
3. Fishers’ perception of
performance of fisheries
authorities §
— Fisheries authorities have had an important
role in preventing the depletion of fishery
resources in the community: 23% agreed, 77%
disagreed.
— In order to improve local fisheries,
implementation and enforcement of regulations
by local authorities were needed: 87% agreed, 3%
disagreed, 10% neutral.
— 44% agreed with the statement, 47%
disagreed, 9% neutral.
— 80% agreed with the statement, 7% disagreed,
13% neutral.
4. Fishers’ attitude toward
access regulation §
— Only people from the community should be
allowed to fish in local fishing grounds: 87%
agreed, 7% disagreed, 6% didn't know/did not
answer.
— 64% agreed with the statement, 31%
disagreed, 4% neutral.
5. Fishers’ incentives to join
formalized groups |
— Would prefer working as member of
formalized group (47%). Would prefer working
independently (53%).
— Would prefer working as member of
formalized group (40%). Would prefer working
independently (53%). Didn’t know/had no
answer (7%).
6. Usefulness of the
biosphere reserve (only
assessed in Bahía de Los
Ángeles) |
— The reserve has neither benefitted nor been
detrimental to them (71%).
If  given again the choice of establishing a reserve:
— Would again decide to have a reserve, mainly
to take care of fishing products (47% of
respondents). Would decide not to have a reserve,
mainly because they fear it would bring
additional restrictions on fishing (30% of
respondents). Said it does not make any
difference to them if  there is or there is not a
reserve (10%). Didn’t know/had no answer (13%).
† Percentages are relative to each sample.
‡ Question 1: Open-ended; only top four categories are shown.
§ Questions 2 to 4: 5-point Likert scale. Responses “agree” and “strongly agree” are computed together as “% of agreement”.
Responses “disagree” and “strongly disagree” are computed together as “% of disagreement”.
| Questions 5 and 6: Close-ended questions combined with open-ended questions to inquire the reasons behind their answers.
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Table 3. License holders with permission to operate in Bahía de Los Ángeles in 2008—2009 (all fishing sectors) and in Bahía de Kino
in 2007—2008 (for four main target species of commercial diving). Data source: Comisión Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca
(CONAPESCA).
Fishing licenses, by species † 
Community License
holders ‡
Octopus
(no.)
Pen
shell
(no.)
Lobster
(no.)
Geoduck
(no.)
Giant
squid
(no.)
Escama
permit §
(no.)
Mullet
(no.)
Shark
permit|
(no.)
Bahía de Kino
(diving)
JLH 1 1(5) 1(5) 1(5)
JLH 2 1(12) 1(12)
JLH 3 1(8) 1(8)
JLH 4 1(4)
JLH 5 1(3)
ILH 1 1(3) 1(7) 1(3)
ILH 2 1(2) 1(2)
ILH 3 1(2) 1(2)
ILH 4 1(6)
ILH 5 1(5)
ILH 6 1(3)
Total (licenses and
boats authorized)
7(38) 5(31) 3(10) 4(18)
Bahía de Los
Ángeles (all
sectors)
JLH1 1(5) 1(6) 1(6) 1(3)
JLH2 1(7)
JLH3 1(2)
JLH4 1(3) 1(3)
JLH5 1(3) 1(3)
JLH6 1(4)
ILH1 1(7)
ILH2 1(3) 1(3) 1(2)
ILH3 1(2) 1(2) 1(2)
ILH4 1(5) 1(5)
ILH5 1(4)
ILH6 1(3)
ILH7 1(1)
ILH8 1(1)
ILH9 1(2) 1(6) 1(2)
ILH10 1(2) 1(2)
ILH11 1(2) 1(1)
ILH12 1(5) 1(5)
ILH13 1 
(unspecified)
ILH14 1(1)
Total (licenses and
boats authorized)
12(44) 1(3) 3(7) 10(32) 4(17) 5(10)
†  The number of boats allowed to operate per license and species is indicated between parentheses. Generally, license holders use
the same (physical) boats to harvest several species (the same boat is registered in more than one license).
‡ JLH = juridical license holder (typically Sociedades de Producción Rural in Bahía de Los Ángeles and fishing coops in Bahía de
Kino). ILH = individual license holder. License holders marked in bold were those that actively received fishing products from
local fishers during the study period.
§ The “escama” (fish with scales) license allows fishing 200 bony fish species. In 2007 there were 30 escama licenses total in Bahía de
Kino but only four (shown here) were used to report species of fish target of commercial divers (mainly groupers and snappers).
| The shark license allows fishing many elasmobranchs species including rays, sharks, and related species.
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Fig. 4. Coastal extension of predios (complete polygon coordinates were unavailable) granted
inside the Bahía de los Ángeles, Canales de Ballenas y de Salsipuedes Biosphere Reserve from late
2007 to late 2008, and the corresponding quotas in tonnes per predio holder. 
were individual predio holders perceived as illegitimate—an 80-
year-old mother of local fishers and a married couple (with one
predio each) living 500 km away who bought sea cucumber from
local fishers.  
There is low compliance with predio boundaries and quotas
around Bahía de Los Ángeles, and the resource is severely depleted
(Calderón-Aguilera and Herrero-Perezrul 2011). As the only legal
way to exploit protected species, predios are used to launder illegal
catches, as is often the case for fisheries managed under licenses
(Bourillón 2002, Cinti et al. 2010a). The fishing sector does not
participate in the state sea cucumber committee (Avendaño-
Ceceña 2007) and although many of the predios are located inside
an MPA, resources for enforcement are limited. 
MPAs 
The Bahía de los Ángeles, Canales de Ballenas y de Salsipuedes
Biosphere Reserve was formally established in June 2007 (Diario
Oficial de la Federación 2007b), comprising approximately
385,000 ha. It has the dual purpose of preserving ecological values
and enhancing fishery productivity and extends over the full range
of local fishers’ fishing grounds (Fig. 2). Preferred access to
commercial activities (fishing, recreation) inside the buffer zone
of the reserve must be granted to the members of the community
or communities adjacent to the reserve (Art. 10, Diario Oficial de
la Federación 2007b).  
At the time of our study, the development of the management
plan had not begun (it started in early 2009) and there were no
fishery restrictions in place except for six small core-zones, which
did not include important fishing areas and forbade extractive
uses. Results from interviews suggest that fishing activities
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continued as if  no reserve had been established. We asked fishers
from Bahía de Los Ángeles whether the reserve had benefitted
them and in what ways; if  the reserve was detrimental to them
and in what ways; and what their decision would be if  they were
to be given the choice to create a reserve again (see Table 2). Most
respondents stated that the reserve has been neither beneficial nor
detrimental. Forty-seven percent would still support the creation
of a reserve; safeguarding local resources was the most frequent
reason expressed, but many also commented that enforcement
was necessary. Thirty percent stated that if  given the choice again,
they would decide against a reserve due to concerns about
unwanted restrictions. Ten percent said it would not make any
difference to them whether or not there was a reserve.  
At the time of our study, lack of enforcement and lack of
definition of access rights were critical weaknesses of this MPA.
To date, preferential access rights for local fishers are still pending
and an increased and stable presence of fisheries and
environmental inspectors is still lacking (E. Torreblanca, personal
observation).
Fishers’ formal organization
In Bahía de Los Ángeles, the three Sociedad de Producción Rural
with fishing licenses were constituted almost entirely by fishers.
Most had some indication of incipient cooperative behavior,
except for one that functioned as an individual license holder, with
one or two absentee operator members in control of the group
while the rest worked as independent fishers, selling their catch
to the Sociedades de Producción Rural without receiving
additional benefits. 
In contrast, most formal groups holding licenses in Bahía de Kino,
typically cooperatives, functioned in practice as individual license
holders (Cinti et al. 2010a). The two cooperatives holding licenses
for diving products whose members were all fishers at the time of
our study had major administrative problems.  
When asked about their associative preferences, about 50% of
respondents from both communities preferred working as part of
a formal group, mainly because it improved access to licenses and
government benefits (Table 2). The challenges of working as part
of a group and greater independence for working and selling one’s
product were the main reasons for preferring to work
independently.
Informal fishery arrangements
Communal sense of use-rights and defense of “own” territory
from outsiders 
In Bahía de Los Ángeles, the presence of a coastal “ejido” (a
system of communal land tenure) generates a strong “sense of
use-rights” among community members over the fishing grounds
within ejido limits, as if  land rights have been informally extended
to include the adjacent sea. The sea territory within ejido limits
—from Punta La Asamblea to Estero San Rafael (Fig. 1)—is
considered part of the community and is where members fish (Fig.
2), disregarding the spatial boundaries of existing formal
management tools. For example, fish species’ licenses are generally
granted for large geographic areas (some are valid for the entire
Gulf of California), with the requisite that the catch be landed in
Bahía de Los Ángeles, whereas benthic species licenses and
predios include relatively small areas located “inside” ejido
borders. In Bahía de Los Ángeles it is locally accepted that as long
as you belong to the community, you are allowed to fish anywhere
within ejidal limits. 
Ejido Ganadero, Turístico y Pétreo Tierra y Libertad (or Ejido
Tierra y Libertad) (Fig. 1) was founded in Bahía de Los Ángeles
in 1970; it consisted of 62 members (Vargas et al. 2007), most of
whom were dedicated to fishing. Today, it consists of about 90
members, with approximately 90% dedicated to fishery-related
activities and/or tourism and 10% to cattle ranching (F. Smith
and A. Reséndiz, personal communication).  
Interviews suggest that this communal, informal sense of use-
rights among Bahía de Los Ángeles residents (not just ejido
members) over the adjacent sea started to emerge when the ejido
and the Sociedad Cooperativa de Producción Pesquera Ejidal
Canal de Ballenas, or SCPPECB, were formed. The SCPPECB
was the first fishing cooperative in Bahía de Los Ángeles and was
founded in 1970, following the foundation of the ejido. The
SCPPECB facilitated access to fishing licenses for legal harvesting
of sea turtle, which were available only to formal groups (I.
Verdugo, personal communication). When ejidos were established
in the area, adjacent ejidos started to claim the fishing grounds
within their own ejidal limits; each ejido’s boundaries were
generally respected without the need for external intervention (F.
Smith, personal communication). The relationship between
neighboring ejidos has been relatively good over time and crossing
boundaries was mutually accepted. It was not until the past 10 to
15 years, with the arrival of boats from distant communities on
the Sonoran coast and the Pacific side of the Baja California
peninsula, that Bahía de Los Ángeles residents started to enforce
ejidal limits more vigorously. The influx of boats from distant
communities is considered an intrusion by Bahía de Los Ángeles
residents, which increased demand for support from fisheries
authorities, including formal requests by ejido leaders to expel
outsiders. In Bahía de Los Ángeles, the community organizes to
discourage outsiders, generally without authorities’ intervention.
The remoteness of Bahía de Los Ángeles makes it relatively easy
for residents to use simple strategies like agreeing not to sell or
provide drinking water to outsiders. Local fishers generally reject
not only the intrusion of boats but also the arrival of fishers from
distant communities looking for an opportunity to work in local
boats. 
In Bahía de Kino, although there is no ejido, residents also tend
to reject the intrusion of boats from other communities. Local
fishers consider their territory to generally coincide with the
jurisdiction of fishing licenses, approximately from Puerto
Libertad to Estero Tastiota (Fig. 1), irrespective of whether fishers
hold a license. The exception is the Infiernillo Channel, which is
recognized as Seri territory (Basurto 2005). Access to local fishing
grounds by outsiders, especially from southern Sonora, Sinaloa,
and Nayarit, generates strong conflicts (Cinti et al. 2010a). Local
fishers and community members react by organizing protests or
blocking the paved road into town. This occurs regardless of the
fact that local divers encroach on other communities’ territories.
Fishers are, however, generally willing to accept fishers from
outside the community if  they work as crew members on local
boats. 
Generally, neither Bahía de Los Ángeles nor Bahía de Kino fishers
enforce the individual boundaries of the licenses or predios they
hold or work under, but they do care about and defend the area
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that they perceive as belonging to their community as a whole. A
large percentage of respondents in both communities agreed that
only locals should be allowed to fish in local fishing grounds; an
appreciably higher percentage felt this way in Bahía de Los
Ángeles versus Bahía de Kino (87% and 64%, respectively, Table
2).
ENABLING CONDITIONS FOR SUSTAINABILITY AND
SELF-ORGANIZATION
To illustrate similarities and differences between communities, we
used the list of critical enabling conditions for sustainability on
the commons (Agrawal 2001) and a set of contextual variables
that affect the probability of users developing or changing rules
(Ostrom 2007) (Table 4). The comparison is descriptive (no
ranking system), but is based on an expert knowledge of the area
by the research team.  
While fishers in neither Bahía de Los Ángeles nor Bahía de Kino
have successfully organized to develop institutions for sustainable
use of marine resources, Bahía de Los Ángeles shows many of
the critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons
and self-governance (Table 4), most notably: a smaller size of users
and resources; more clearly defined group and resource
boundaries; greater ease of enforcement of rules due to
community isolation, small user group size, and lower cost
exclusion technology; higher level of shared norms, homogeneity
of identities and interests, and locally devised rules (ejido
institutions playing a key role); and lower levels of articulation
with external markets. Despite differences in the type of policy
tools governing these two fishing communities, both show similar
insufficiencies with regards to support received from the
government in provision of secure rights, enforcement and
sanctioning, and recognition and incorporation of local
arrangements and capacities for management. These issues relate
to the local effects of higher levels of governance and can be
considered, following Agrawal (2001) and Berkes (2006), as
factors of the external environment.  
In light of the distinctive attributes of the two communities, Bahía
de Los Ángeles shows a higher potential for achieving
sustainability of resource use and for local users to participate in
self-governance in the short- to midterm than Bahía de Kino.
DISCUSSION
Both communities have unsecure tenure rights, poor or null
participation of fishers in decision and rule making, a lack of
government recognition of local fishery arrangements, and a lack
of government support for enforcement, all of which are critical
for fisheries sustainability. 
Security of tenure rights is a condition recurrently observed in
long-enduring common pool resource institutions, as stated in
Ostrom’s design principle 7, minimal recognition of rights to
organize (Ostrom 1990): “ . . . the rights of users to devise their
own institutions are not challenged by external government
authorities, and users have long-term tenure rights to the resource”
[emphasis added]. 
Security of tenure rights has gained particular attention in the
case of fisheries in recent decades (Christy 2000, Charles 2002,
FAO 2002, Hilborn 2005). In small-scale fisheries, the
conventional approach to fisheries management (top-down,
assessment-dependent systems, reliant on external enforcement)
has been generally ineffective (Mahon 1997, Berkes et al. 2001).
Management approaches are shifting towards participatory
systems reliant on incentives, where the provision of long-term
use rights in a variety of forms (see Orensanz et al. 2013 for
examples from Latin American benthic small-scale fisheries) is
thought to be a necessary step for incentivizing responsible use
(Hilborn et al. 2005, Orensanz et al. 2005). In our case studies,
neither community (as of 2012) has long-term use rights to the
resources, not only because fishing authorizations are not held by
fishers in most cases and access rights to MPAs are loosely
defined, but also because current policy tools (licenses, in
particular) are loose access regimes (Orensanz et al. 2013) which
do not provide exclusivity of use in the long term. Institutional
mechanisms for strengthening tenure security for fishers should
be pursued in both communities and security of tenure should
probably receive an explicit mention as a separate enabling
condition for sustainability. 
Lack of involvement of fishers in management and policy
decisions, as well as lack of government recognition of informal
fishery arrangements, can be improved with implementation of
incentive systems for long-term use rights. This generally implies
devolution of management authority and increased autonomy at
the local level. “Participation in the creation and modification of
rules by those affected by management regimes” (Ostrom’s design
principle 3 (Ostrom 1990)) and “government recognition of the
rights of users to devise their own rules” (Ostrom's design
principle 7 (Ostrom 1990) and Agrawal’s condition 30 (Agrawal
2001)) are recurrently observed in long-enduring common pool
resource institutions. Local participation and autonomy may
provide management regimes with the necessary flexibility and
adaptability to adjust to local and external conditions (Berkes et
al. 2003) and increase rule legitimacy for those involved in creating
them (likely increasing compliance), as opposed to rules externally
imposed. Management regimes should also be flexible enough to
consider informal tenure arrangements (Johannes 1978, Berkes
2006, Orensanz et al. 2013). Even though Bahía de Los Ángeles
and Bahía de Kino fishers who are members of formalized groups
do have some level of autonomy for devising internal rules,
participation in management decisions and rule making is
practically null. Tenure insecurity from highly informal fishing
practices greatly contributes to this issue. In addition, informal
fishery arrangements (including those related to ejido land rights)
have not been recognized nor incorporated into management and
conservation strategies by the government in either community. 
The third issue we highlight is the lack (or inefficiency) of
supporting external sanctioning institutions (Agrawal’s condition
31 (Agrawal 2001)) that results in de facto open access. There is
general agreement that rules must be enforced in some manner to
achieve robust governance (Ostrom 1990); the presence of local
monitoring of harvesting behavior is characteristic of most long-
surviving resource regimes (design principle 4). External support
for enforcement is also critical to help protect local institutions
and incentivize compliance (Christy 2000, Berkes 2006).
Although both Bahía de Los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino have
some informal sanctioning processes against outsiders, these are
not sufficient. Bahía de Kino is generally an open access system.
In Bahía de Los Ángeles, although simple strategies have been
effective in limiting outsider entry in areas close to town, areas
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Table 4. Critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons (after Agrawal 2001) and institutional emergence (marked with
asterisks, indicating the corresponding variable of the SES framework) (after Ostrom 2007) applied to Bahía de Los Ángeles' and Bahía
de Kino's small-scale fisheries.
 Category Attributes Bahía de Los Ángeles Bahía de Kino
Resource
system
1. Small size (*
RS3)
Yes No
2. Well-defined
boundaries
Yes: fishers work in a clearly defined region
that coincides with the limits of the MPA.
No: Bahía de Kino fishers work over a broad,
continually expanding area.
3. Low levels of
mobility (*RU1)
Generally yes: several target species can be
considered of low mobility (e.g., diving
resources, trap resources, flounder).
Yes, especially in the case of diving resources.
4. Possibility of
storage of benefits
from the resources
Yes/Mixed: more respect for territories and
restricting access although there is increasing
pressure from outsider fishers.
No: even for benthic species, there is great
pressure from other fishers/tragedy of the
commons situation.
5. Predictability (*
RS7)
Moderate: for certain species, such as sea
cucumber, fishers are conducting monitoring
and can anticipate future harvest.
No: even for species where fishers are conducting
monitoring, the lack of access control makes
predictability difficult.
Productivity of the
system (*RS5)
(variable not
included in
Agrawal’s list)
Scarce for several species although with
possibilities for recovery due to highly
productive environment.
Scarce for most species, although with
possibilities for recovery due to highly productive
environment.
Users 6. Small groups (*
U1)
Yes No
7. Clearly defined
boundaries
Yes: fishers tend to belong to one group and
only work with that group; community
membership is fairly clear.
No: although fishers may belong to a particular
group, boundaries are fluid and individuals may
work with multiple groups; community
membership is dynamic.
8. Shared norms (*
U6)
Yes: ejido plays key role. No/Mixed: although fishers may have shared
norms, there also exist mechanisms for getting
around those norms.
9. Good leadership
(*U5)
Yes: 52% (n=81) thought there was someone
in the community who could serve as a
representative for fishers and one person
received 27% of the vote (Duberstein 2009).
No: only 37% (n=81) felt there was someone in
the community who could serve as a
representative for fishers, and one person
received 13% of the vote (Duberstein 2009).
10. Past successful
experience
Yes/Mixed: some challenges in the past, but
recent successful experiences have created a
basis for future successes.
No/Mixed: some success in the past, but in recent
years fishers have mainly faced challenges.
11.
Interdependence
between group
members
Yes/mixed: in functional Sociedades de
Producción Rural members have different
skills and responsibilities.
No/Mixed: fishers are largely dependent on
license holders.
12. Similarities in
identities and
interests
Yes: Bahía de Los Ángeles is a small town
where most people have grown up together
and there is a lower amount of outside
influence and therefore more homogeneity in
identities and interests.
No/Mixed: Bahía de Kino, with its close
proximity to the state capital of Hermosillo, as
well as the nearby agricultural town of Miguel
Aleman and a regular influx of tourists from
elsewhere in the country and the U.S., has many
outside influences. Although fishers have a
certain level of similarity in identities and
interests, these outside factors result in more
heterogeneity.
13. Low levels of
poverty
No/Mixed: similar situation to Bahía de
Kino, although Bahía de Los Ángeles fishers
seem to have made the leap to ecotourism in a
way that Bahía de Kino fishers have not.
No/Mixed: fishers generally do not make much
money, although some live quite well (especially
those who work in black market species); license
holders, in particular, make a good living.
(con'd)
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14. Overlap
between user group
residential location
and resource
location
Yes: most fishers work in the area adjacent to
the community of Bahía de Los Ángeles.
No/Mixed: Bahía de Kino fishers have a large
work area, some of which is close to the
community and some is distant. Bahía de Kino
stands out among other communities in the Gulf
by having fishers that travel long distances to
work.
15. High levels of
dependence on the
resource system (*
U8)
Yes: some fishers are venturing into tourism,
although the remote location of the
community makes this a limited venture.
Because Bahía de Los Ángeles fishers work
within a discrete region, they are more
dependent on the resource system.
Mixed/Yes: proximity to other population
centers, tourism, construction, etc. gives options;
due to the large size of the fishing zone, Bahía de
Kino fishers are less dependent on a single area
or fishery.
16. Fairness in
allocation of
benefits from
common resources
Yes/Mixed: benefits seem to generally be
reasonably fairly distributed among crew or
SPR members; there also exist situations
where the license holder (and not the fisher)
receives a large proportion of the benefits.
No: license holders receive a disproportionate
amount of benefits from common resources, as
well as fishers from other communities. However,
benefits made by the crew seem to generally be
reasonably fairly distributed among crew
members.
17. Low levels of
user demand
Moderate No
18. Gradual change
in level of demand
No No
Knowledge of
SES/mental models
(*U7) (variable not
included in
Agrawal’s list).
Probably more complete due to the smallness
and clearly defined fishing territory.
Probably less complete than in Bahía de Los
Ángeles due to the diffuseness of their fishing
territory.
Institutional
framework
19. Rules are
simple and easy to
understand
Yes/Mixed No
20. Locally devised
access and
management rules
(*GS5 & GS6)
Yes: Bahía de Los Ángeles fishers have a more
organized system of mechanisms for
delineating boundaries and restricting access
to outside fishers.
No/Mixed: although fishers have a sense of
home territory and purport to resist efforts of
outsiders to fish within this range, the system is
largely open access.
21. Ease in
enforcement of
rules
Mixed: would be greatly eased with external
support.
No: enforcement of rules is much more difficult
in Bahía de Kino due to high accessibility and
the size of the territory to oversea.
22. Graduated
sanctions
Mixed: some Sociedades de Producción Rural
have some graduated sanctions.
No: generally no sanctions are applied.
23. Availability of
low-cost
adjudication
No: conflicts are informally resolved. No: conflicts are informally resolved.
24. Accountability
of monitors and
other officials to
users
No: inspectors and other officials are
generally accountable to higher level
authorities.
No: inspectors and other officials are generally
accountable to higher level authorities.
25. Match
restrictions on
harvests to
regeneration of
resources
Yes/Mixed: exists for sea cucumber, for which
monitoring is carried out, although harvests
have exceeded regeneration; not as much for
other species for which monitoring programs
currently do not exist.
No/Mixed: although some groups have tried to
institute monitoring efforts and match harvest to
monitoring results, lack of ability to restrict
access makes limiting harvest nearly impossible.
External
environment
26. Low-cost
exclusion
technology
Yes: simple mechanisms like not providing
water or not buying the catch of outside
fishers create a no-cost means to discourage
fishers from outside from working in the
region.
No
(con'd)
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27. Time for
adaptation of new
technologies
related to the
commons
Yes/Mixed: the remoteness of Bahía de Los
Ángeles may give fishers a more flexible
timeframe for adapting to new technologies.
No/Mixed: pressure from other fishers/tragedy of
the commons situation limits the amount of time
available for adaptation to new technologies.
28. Low levels of
articulation with
external markets
Yes: at level of fisher. No: at level of buyer/
license holder; shows lower levels overall than
Bahía de Kino.
Mixed/Yes: at level of fisher—proximity to
Hermosillo/other population centers makes it
easier for fishers to connect with external
markets. No: at level of buyer/license holder.
29. Gradual change
in articulation with
external markets
Moderate: with improved internet and
communication, these changes are becoming
more rapid, although the lack of technology
in fisher homes and the community in
general, as well as geographic isolation, makes
this process slower in Bahía de Los Ángeles.
Moderate: with improved internet and
communication, these changes are becoming
more rapid.
30. No
undermining of
local authorities by
central government
Moderate: although the same situation exists
in Bahía de Kino, in Bahía de Los Ángeles
fishers have demonstrated more success in
local governance and in working with central
government (with Comision Nacional de
Áreas Naturales Protegidas (CONANP) in
particular) to maintain this success; an NGO
(PRONATURA) has provided critical
support to facilitate access of fishers to
fishing licenses and foster participation in
management.
No: central government regulations (e.g., for
licenses, for reporting catch) make it challenging
for many fishers to gain legal access to the
resource and make it easy for license holders to
retain power. An NGO (Comunidad y
Biodiversidad) has provided critical support to
facilitate access of fishers to fishing licenses and
foster participation in management, but success
has been limited due to enormous challenges.
31. Supporting
external
sanctioning
institutions
No No
32. Appropriate
levels of external
aid to compensate
local users for
conservation
actions
Moderate/Yes: a small group of fishers
receives income for participating in
monitoring activities 43% have received
financial support through government
programs (Duberstein 2009).
No/Moderate: a small group of fishers receives
income for participating in monitoring activities;
19% have received financial support through
government programs (Duberstein 2009).
33. Nested levels of
appropriation,
provision,
enforcement,
governance
Mixed: relatively good articulation only exists
with CONANP, the agency in charge of
administering MPAs.
No/Mixed: articulation between higher and local
levels of governance has been generally poor.
located farther away, like Ángel de la Guarda Island, are difficult
to control without external support. Despite recent efforts to
improve enforcement through an interinstitutional enforcement
committee (with fisheries and environmental authorities) and a
community enforcement team, increased and stable presence of
inspectors is still lacking.  
The set of issues described above is related to the lack or
inefficiency of cross-scale governance (Berkes 2006) or nested
enterprises (Ostrom’s design principle 8 (Ostrom 1990) and
Agrawal’s condition 33 (Agrawal 2001)), where higher and local
levels of governance do not effectively complement each other to
prevent overuse.  
Results of comparative studies in small-scale fisheries clearly
demonstrate that the above factors facilitate sustainability.
Orensanz et al. (2005) compared three management regimes of
benthic small-scale fisheries in South America and suggested
management prescriptions such as the promotion of systems that
provide long-term use rights; the promotion of participation of
fishers and other stakeholders, managers, and scientists in joint
discussions of management issues; and capitalizing on fishers’
knowledge. Cinner et al. (2012) studied the occurrence of
Ostrom’s design principles in 20 long-enduring and dynamic
small-scale fisheries systems in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea,
and Mexico and highlighted three trends: most cases had clearly
defined resource boundaries and membership, all cases had
flexibility and autonomy in making and changing rules, and most
cases lacked cross-scale linkages with higher levels of governance,
suggesting that they may lack the institutional embeddedness
required to confront some common pool resource challenges
(Cinner et al. 2012). Orensanz et al. (2013) studied the
performance of 20 management regimes of benthic small-scale
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fisheries in Latin America and suggested as the most salient
lessons “the need to attend to the multiple aspects of sustainability
(biological, social, economical, institutional) when a system is
implemented, providing for flexibility and adaptiveness, creating
ambits for interaction among stakeholders, and counting on
transparent and effective support from the state regarding
enforcement, legislation and courts.” 
There are many factors that account for fisheries sustainability,
and those we emphasized in this study are not the only important
aspects to consider. Nonetheless, the factors we highlighted here
arise as important needs to address in order to achieve long-term
sustainability. 
Studies that address the links between land and sea institutions
and their effects on stewardship of fishery resources (freshwater
or marine) are practically unaddressed in the literature. To the
best of our knowledge, only two published articles have addressed
links between land institutions and their effects on some aspect
of fishery resource use or management (freshwater or marine).
Basurto (2006) documented that the communal ownership of the
land by the Seri, an indigenous group by the east Gulf of
California coast, gives them more authority to determine with
whom they will conduct business, providing more bargaining
power at the moment of commercializing their harvests. Arce-
Ibarra and Charles (2008) working in freshwater fisheries inside
ejidos of Quintana Roo, Mexico, found that resources within
these ejidos can be considered open access. Protection of fishery
resources from people wanting to access them is weak; the authors
suggest that this might be due to the secondary role of fishing as
a source of income for these communities. The present study
presents for first time a case where ejidos have a strong effect on
how the members of a community perceive and defend their rights
to access the marine resources located adjacent to their communal
land but formally outside the boundaries. In Bahía de Los
Ángeles, land institutions have perhaps stronger impacts on
decisions affecting fishery resource use than rules specifically
created to manage fisheries, likely due to the salience of fishing
for Bahía de Los Ángeles residents. This underscores the
importance of fully understanding local rules-in-use when
designing management strategies and developing laws and
regulations.
CONCLUSIONS
Our study investigated formal and informal rules-in-use
regulating access and resource use by small-scale fishers in the
two most important fishing communities of the Midriff  Islands
region, Gulf of California, Mexico, which is an area of
exceptional value for fisheries and conservation. In both cases,
insufficient support from the government in provision of secure
rights, enforcement and sanctioning, and recognition and
incorporation of local arrangements and capacities for
management arose as important needs to address.  
In order to achieve long-term sustainability of fishery resources
in the region, it is critical to consider formal and informal rules-
in-use, as well as mechanisms for management and enforcement
and their interactions at multiple levels (for example, land vs. sea
institutions, higher level vs. local level governance).
Understanding these intricate interactions, including how fishers
perceive and defend their territory, may help managers devise
strategies for management and enforcement that make sense to
resource users, thus leading to improved opportunities for the
long-term conservation of fishery resources.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5570
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